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The South is at last being brought to the painful point of taking stock
of itself and of facing in their particularity and concreteness the facts
in its chronic social and economic maladjustments.
1
—Walter Wilbur (1934)
History is filled with unforeseeable situations that call for some
flexibility of action.
2
—Franklin D. Roosevelt (1935)

INTRODUCTION
Malaria was a significant problem in the southern United States during the
early decades of the twentieth century. Part of President Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s New Deal focused on economic development of the South, with
improvement of public health in that region as an integral part. This Article is
a case study of increased federal public health efforts during the New Deal and
World War II eras, which replaced some traditionally state and local areas of
control as well as private philanthropic efforts.
The rise of the New Deal administrative state saw structural
experimentation and innovation at a grand level; this Article’s study of federal
efforts to combat malaria in the southern United States provides a good
example. In one decade, federal efforts ranged from Works Progress
Administration employment, experiments with scientific expertise within the
Tennessee Valley Authority, federal intervention in civilian areas as a warstrength rationale, and malaria control by federal appropriation. The most
significant step resulted from reorganization of the New Deal administrative
state under the Federal Security Agency (FSA), an independent agency of the
U.S. government established pursuant to the Reorganization Act of 1939.3 The

1 Walter Wilbur, Special Problems of the South, 176 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 49, 49
(1934). Wilbur, a Charleston, South Carolina lawyer, was a member of the field staff of the Federal
Emergency Relief Administration when he wrote this article in 1934. Among other observations, Wilbur
noted:

Take the measure of the public welfare at any point and the answer is the same: whether the
statistics concern infant mortality or illiteracy, tuberculosis or venereal disease, insanity and
feeble-mindedness or malaria or pellagra, crime or per capita wealth and income, the Southern
States compete for place at the foot of the column.
Id. at 52.
2 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PEACE AND WAR 272 (1943) (quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Statement Approving S.J. Resolution 173 (Aug. 31, 1935)).
3 Reorganization Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 19, 53 Stat. 561.
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Reorganization Act was heralded as the first major, planned reorganization of
the Executive Branch of the U.S. government since 1787.
Long-lasting effects of this New Deal-era experimentation included
partnerships between the federal government and the states, and the permanent
establishment of what had been a temporary wartime agency into the federal
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), located in Atlanta on property donated by
Emory University.4 The CDC is today the largest federal agency outside of the
Washington, D.C. area,5 established in a region that at the time was highly
resistant to and suspicious of federal agency activity.
Efforts to “federalize” the mosquito encountered significant limitations,
and never accomplished (if indeed it had been the aim) primary federal
responsibility for the eradication of malaria. Public health law in the United
States is still largely a matter of state authority. Because public health was
historically and firmly within the responsibilities of states, federal agencies in
the New Deal era worked through state and local governments.6 Roosevelt’s
hoped-for national health insurance scheme would not be included in the
Social Security Act of 1935, and critics abounded for the lack of resources
devoted to the U.S. Public Health Service.7 Both of these failures of New Deal
aims have been attributed to the powerful position of Southern Democrats on
the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means committees.8
But it is nonetheless the case that a greatly enhanced federal role in public
health matters emerged from the New Deal era, with the South’s malaria
problem as the primary impetus. To combat malaria, the federal aim was to
put in place an effective administrative system of distribution—resources and
expertise—without overtly usurping the traditional “police power” function of

4

Theodore J. Bauer, New Home for the Communicable Disease Center, 70 PUB. HEALTH REP. 1104,
1104 (1955).
5 ELIZABETH W. ETHERIDGE, SENTINEL FOR HEALTH: A HISTORY OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE
CONTROL, at xv (1992).
6 Although malaria in the United States is no longer endemic, some rare cases occur in returning
travelers. Particularly in Africa, but also in other parts of the world, malaria remains a significant health
challenge. “Worldwide, between 350 and 500 million people are infected with the disease every year,”
resulting in up to 3 million deaths annually. RANDALL M. PACKARD, THE MAKING OF A TROPICAL DISEASE: A
SHORT HISTORY OF MALARIA, at xvi (2007).
7 Edgar Sydenstricker, Health in the New Deal, 176 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 131, 135, 137
(1934).
8 DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929–
1945, at 262, 340 (1999); Jill Quadagno, Physician Sovereignty and the Purchasers’ Revolt, 29 J. HEALTH
POL. POL’Y & L. 815, 816–17 (2004).
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state governments, in recognition of political constraints of the time. As in
other key initiatives of the New Deal, the rise of the federal administrative
state required coordination and cooperation with state agencies, and in turn
fostered administrative innovation at the state level.
One federal agency in particular—the Office of Malaria Control in War
Areas (MCWA)—institutionalized the federal response to malaria in the South
during World War II. This assertion of wartime jurisdiction maintained at least
nominally the primacy of state authority. With the war’s conclusion, however,
the war “emergency” ended, along with some of the MCWA’s asserted federal
jurisdiction. Although the MCWA became a permanent establishment as the
CDC and federal malaria-eradication efforts continued in the South, the federal
“takeover,” such as it was, would not be maintained. Executive authority
expanded during World War II, but in the matter of public health as a federal
responsibility, this brief assertion of expanded jurisdiction would be
withdrawn.
Public health federalism in the United States is a topic of interest today.9
The background for debate about public health federalism stems from the
historical understanding that states possessed exclusive police powers with
respect to the health and welfare of their citizens.10 The federal government
had no such authority within states because the health and welfare of
individuals was not an enumerated power in the Federal Constitution.11 But
despite some claims that the New Deal era profoundly altered the federalism
balance in public health law, I suggest that primary state and local authority in
the realm of public health remained, with no significant federal presence
displacing that state authority. Recognizing that a considerable expansion of
federal government health activities did occur, the federal government was still
limited to a supporting role with respect to public health administration.
The occurrence of malaria in a population results from a complex
interdependence of environmental circumstances and social and economic

9 See, e.g., James G. Hodge, Jr., The Role of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 12 J.L. & HEALTH
309 (1998) (reviewing the historical federal role in public health law); Wendy E. Parmet, After September 11:
Rethinking Public Health Federalism, 30 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 201 (2002) (exploring public health federalism,
including doctrinal developments that may restrict the federal government’s ability to regulate).
10 As Larry Gostin has summarized, “The states and localities have had the predominant public
responsibility for population-based health services since the founding of the republic.” LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN,
PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 47 (2000).
11 The Federalist Papers, among other sources, confirms this understanding prior to ratification of the
U.S. Constitution. See Parmet, supra note 9, at 202.
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relationships, dependent upon poverty and inequality as much as geography
and climate.12 The history of efforts to control malaria in the South in the early
twentieth century included local, state, and federal governments, along with
private philanthropy and private businesses. This division of authority and the
complexity of the malaria problem expose the multifaceted nature of public
health law in this period.
I. MALARIA IN THE SOUTHERN UNITED STATES: PHILANTHROPY, PRIVATE
ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL CONTROL EFFORTS
Malaria, along with other mosquito-borne diseases such as yellow fever,
affected every region of U.S. territory in the late eighteenth through the midnineteenth centuries. By the turn of the twentieth century, however, malaria
was largely a problem of the southern United States, and would remain so
through the 1940s.
The South’s long history of poor health is well documented, as is its
distinctive picture as having the worst health in the nation throughout the
nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries.13 Malaria was endemic and
remained the principal cause of disability and death.14 The carrier for the
spread of the disease—the anopheles mosquito—was not identified until
1898.15 Its control and eventual eradication in the southern United States
awaited the early decades of the twentieth century, when journalists began to
make the rest of the nation aware of the South’s health plight. This new
publicity surrounding the “shocking state of southern health” would eventually
lead to assistance from northern philanthropies and the federal government.16
In the warmer southern climate, the anopheles mosquito could survive to
breed year round. Spread of the disease relied upon the mosquito vector—a
mosquito became infected with the malaria parasite from a human carrier, and
in turn, would spread the disease to other humans. Malaria was thus constantly
present in these climates. Moreover, once the malaria parasite infected human
hosts, the disease was difficult to eradicate. The only treatment until well into
the twentieth century was quinine, an expensive medication, and few
12

Charles E. Rosenberg, Foreword to PACKARD, supra note 6, at vii–ix.
James O. Breeden, Disease as a Factor in Southern Distinctiveness, in DISEASE AND DISTINCTIVENESS
IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 1, 8–9 (Todd L. Savitt & James Harvey Young eds., 1988).
14 Id. at 10.
15 Martin D. Young, Scientific Exploration and Achievement in the Field of Malaria, 52 J.
PARASITOLOGY 3, 4 (1966).
16 Id. at 14.
13
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physicians at the time recognized the need to continue the medicine long after
the disappearance of symptoms of high fever, headache, nausea, and profuse
sweating.17
In 1916, the American Medical Association published a report on public
health work in the states.18 The author of the report, Charles V. Chapin, noted
the serious burden of malaria in the South. He reported that in one small
manufacturing town nearly 50% of the inhabitants had suffered in one summer
from “chills and fever.”19 But he noted that little systematic work to eradicate
malaria had been done by the states, and because of the tremendous burden on
the people where it prevailed, it was “surprising that so little has been
accomplished by state officials for its control.”20
In the early years of the twentieth century, the prevalence of malaria in the
South (along with other preventable diseases such as hookworm, pellagra, and
typhoid) was recognized as an economic problem, one that caused extensive
retardation of economic development because of its social costs and draining
effect on labor. The poverty of the region, due in no small part to the presence
of hookworm and malaria, drew the efforts of philanthropists and private
industry well before President Roosevelt labeled the South the nation’s number
one economic problem.21
Throughout the New Deal era, Roosevelt articulated a strategy of spending
money in the South to develop the region economically, with the Tennessee
Valley Authority as a prominent example. The average income in the South
amounted to as little as one-quarter of what Americans in richer states
earned.22 This discrepancy derived largely, as one southern senator admitted,
from the different labor market imposed on the “great many colored people in
the South.”23

17 John Duffy, The Impact of Malaria on the South, in DISEASE AND DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE AMERICAN
SOUTH, supra note 13, at 29, 31–32.
18 CHARLES V. CHAPIN, A REPORT ON STATE PUBLIC HEALTH WORK BASED ON A SURVEY OF STATE
BOARDS OF HEALTH (Arno Press 1977) (1916).
19 Id. at 107.
20 Id. at 107–08.
21 Louis Stark, South Is Declared ‘No. 1’ by President in Economic Need, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 1938, at 1.
The President’s letter that formed a basis for the Times story is reprinted in NAT’L EMERGENCY COUNCIL,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THE SOUTH 1 (1938).
22 ERIC RAUCHWAY, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL 100 (2008).
23 Id.
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Rural areas throughout the United States exhibited a marked disparity to
urban populations. In 1934, only one farm household in ten had an indoor
toilet.24 Frequent pregnancies, medically unattended childbirths, malnutrition,
pellagra, malaria, hookworm, and other parasites exacted heavy tolls. More
than 1,300 rural counties had no hospital, and most of them lacked even a
public health nurse.25 As one historian has noted, “In this generally dismal
picture, the southeastern states were the most dismal by far.”26
In response to Roosevelt’s request for a report on the economic conditions
of the South, the National Emergency Council in 1938 termed that region “a
belt of sickness, misery, and unnecessary death.”27 Prominent in this
assessment was the presence of malaria, affecting more than two million
people annually and estimated to reduce the industrial output of the region by
one-third.28 The report estimated the annual costs of deaths from malaria alone
to be $39,500,000, not including lost productivity and costs for treating the
illness.29
The incidence of malaria in the South grew markedly worse during the
Great Depression. Yet, by the end of World War II, malaria in the United
States was largely conquered. One federal agency—the MCWA, the founding
institution for the CDC—claimed the lion’s share of responsibility for the
eradication of malaria by the 1950s. The claims are difficult to evaluate,
although it is certain that federal government efforts, most notably those of the
MCWA, played a large role.
But these federal efforts were preceded by an assortment of state and local
efforts to control malaria, highly reliant before the Great Depression on outside
philanthropy (although little philanthropy was directed specifically toward
malaria) and the initiatives of private businesses. An evaluation of federal
steps against malaria in the New Deal era requires, first, an overview of
preexisting state and local efforts.

24
25
26
27
28
29

KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 192.
Id.
Id.
NAT’L EMERGENCY COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 29.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.
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A. State Health Departments and Private Philanthropy
State health departments in the South, although in some instances dating
from the Reconstruction era, functioned with extreme financial and expertise
limitations in the early decades of the twentieth century. In most southern
states, a county or municipal health board served as the primary public health
agency. Not all rural counties had one, and even in more populous counties,
funding was often nonexistent or was voted piecemeal by local government
units. Staffing might include a local physician who would provide advice to
elected officials, primarily in the event of an infectious disease outbreak such
as yellow fever.30
Control of infectious disease—and especially malaria, which was viewed as
less frightening than yellow fever but still a chronic problem—depended on
two things. First, the scientific cause of malaria from mosquitoes was a
relatively recent discovery. Scientific breakthroughs occurred following the
Spanish-American War and the building of the Panama Canal.31 Replacing
folk beliefs about the cause of malaria in the South required wider
dissemination of these discoveries, as well as recommended means of
prevention as advised by experts. Even in the early 1920s, the mosquito as the
vector of malaria was still by no means widely accepted in rural populations.
Second, with the scientific focus on mosquito control followed the need for
financial resources. The southern climate, combined with stagnant bodies of
water—large and small—provided fertile areas for mosquito reproduction.
These bodies of water could be drained or treated with a larvicide, but were
ubiquitous and required continued maintenance. Inhabitants of these areas
often lived in substandard housing, creating an urgent need for wire-mesh
screens in homes.32 All of these measures were costly, and southern health
30 For descriptions of state and local public health activities in some southern states during this period,
see T. F. ABERCROMBIE, HISTORY OF PUBLIC HEALTH IN GEORGIA, 1733–1950, at 155 (1953); Lucie Robertson
Bridgforth, The Politics of Public Health Reform: Felix J. Underwood and the Mississippi State Board of
Health, 1924–58, PUB. HISTORIAN, Summer 1984, at 5, 7 (1984); Jo Ann Carrigan, Yellow Fever: Scourge of
the South, in DISEASE AND DISTINCTIVENESS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, supra note 13, at 66; J.G. Townsend,
The Full-Time County Health Program Developed in the Mississippi Valley Following the Flood, 43 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 1199, 1202 (1928). For a description of state and local practices in the late nineteenth century,
see Margaret Warner, Local Control Versus National Interest: The Debate over Southern Public Health,
1878–1884, 50 J.S. HIST. 407 (1984).
31 MARGARET HUMPHREYS, MALARIA: POVERTY, RACE, AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES
47–48 (2001).
32 See PACKARD, supra note 6, at 72–73 (discussing how economic and living conditions contributed to
the spread of malaria in the South).
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departments were in no position to provide them, even assuming that they had
the political will to do so in poverty-stricken, racially segregated, rural areas.
Moreover, drainage projects had to be maintained, and when they were not, all
previous gains were quickly erased.33
Taxpayer funding for state and local health activities in the South was
practically nonexistent in these decades, hampering efforts of state and local
health departments to address any chronic disease in lieu of more immediate
outbreaks and emergencies.34 The general problem of poverty exacerbated
race and class problems in many southern regions.35 Efforts at mosquito
control, in particular, were hampered by the rigid system of racial segregation
and a long-standing class conflict in the white community.36
Commenting on efforts at public sanitation in the late nineteenth century,
one physician in Charleston, South Carolina, stated: “I despair of the State, in
its present Africanized condition, spending money to improve health. Twothirds of our Legislature would think such money thrown away.”37 The lag in
spending for public health initiatives in the South continued through the early
twentieth century. Even when politicians promoted health as an essential
element for economic development for their regions, funds for malaria control
remained at the bottom of a long list of priorities.38
One northern journalist wrote in 1879 about sanitation problems in
Memphis, Tennessee:
A large sum of money was raised last year in the North for the relief
of this city, but very little came from Southern communities. With all
the warning that was given by the fever then, nothing has since been
done in the way of drainage or purification. The fact is, Memphis is
one of the filthiest towns in all the South . . . . The yellow-fever
33

Id. at 72.
See Bridgforth, supra note 30, at 5, 10.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Warner, supra note 30, at 408 (quoting Letter from Robert A. Kinloch to Henry I. Bowditch (Mar.
1876), in HENRY I. BOWDITCH, PUBLIC HYGIENE IN AMERICA 242 (1877)).
38 The role of race in allocation of state and local funds for public health in the South is a significant
topic, which I do not explore in this Article. At least two possibilities emerge: First, the relative neglect of
public health measures in rural areas is attributable to the presence of African-Americans in those regions.
Second, it may be that fighting malaria and supporting segregation were both viewed to be “progressive”
measures by leading white southerners in this period. No doubt both propositions may be true. Scientific and
public health literature at the time (and today) suggest that African-Americans were largely immune from the
most virulent forms of malaria in the South. The issue is worth further exploration but must await another
venue.
34
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scourge is one of the evils that follow in the train of slavery and an
imperfect civilization. The worst feature of the sorrow is that the
native inhabitants have no ambition to remove the cause . . . and no
disposition to put their hands in their pockets for the relief of the
39
poor. The North is good enough for them for that.

State health departments in the South encountered significant resistance
from county and municipal health boards. As Chapin noted in 1916, “This
matter of the state health department taking entire charge of local affairs,
thereby displacing local officials, is one of the greatest importance, concerning
which there are wide differences of opinion.”40 Chapin considered this local
opposition “a very practical obstacle” to the “plan of complete state control,”
which he advocated.41 He noted:
In many sections of the country the great body of the citizens are
opposed to the state usurping any more of the functions of their town
or their county. It would be difficult in these states, where home rule
is a fetish, to displace the local health official by the state health
42
official.

Small wonder, then, that federal efforts would prove equally difficult in the
states’-rights haunted South.
The first significant outside efforts to improve public health in the South,
including the scourge of malaria, came from private philanthropy. Most
notable here was the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission (renamed the
Rockefeller Foundation in 1913).43 Beginning around 1910, the promise of
funds and personnel from this organization invigorated health departments
throughout the South. The initial campaign was against hookworm, the cause
of much “mental and physical torpor” characterizing the condition of so many

39

Warner, supra note 30, at 421 (quoting COMMONWEALTH (Boston), July 26, 1879).
CHAPIN, supra note 18, at 75.
41 Id. at 76.
42 Id.
43 See generally JOHN ETTLING, THE GERM OF LAZINESS: ROCKEFELLER PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC
HEALTH IN THE NEW SOUTH (1981) (discussing the origin and successes of the Rockefeller Sanitary
Commission); Darwin H. Stapleton, Historical Perspectives on Malaria: The Rockefeller Antimalaria Strategy
in the 20th Century, 76 MOUNT SINAI J. MED. 468 (2009) (analyzing the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission’s
antimalaria strategy); Darwin H. Stapleton, Lessons of History? Anti-Malaria Strategies of the International
Health Board and the Rockefeller Foundation from the 1920s to the Era of DDT, 119 PUB. HEALTH REP. 206,
206 (2004) (describing the Rockefeller Foundation as “if not at the center, then very near the center” of a
“revolution in malaria control”).
40
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poor southerners.44 For malaria control, however, philanthropy targeted
specific “demonstration” projects in a few areas but did not provide funding
sufficient for statewide efforts.45
Although the Rockefeller Sanitary Commission was the most active
philanthropic organization in the South, others soon joined. The Rosenwald
Fund,46 for example, undertook malaria control efforts on the extensive Delta
and Pine Land Plantation in Mississippi in the 1920s. The fund provided
screens for tenant housing, among other efforts, and the resulting reduction in
malaria among the sharecroppers in the area led to the promotional message,
“[T]he best tenants are attracted to a plantation where the management displays
an active interest in their health and welfare.”47
In a sense, large farm owners who made malaria-control efforts to benefit
their tenants (both black and white sharecroppers) engaged in both private
philanthropy and enlightened self-interest, from a business perspective.
Lawrence J. Nelson has suggested that this form of planter “welfare
capitalism” worked to control malaria, without the need for outside federal
assistance in most rural regions.48 Moreover, historians generally agree that
health and education are central to understanding Progressivism in the South,
and these philanthropic efforts, combined with local initiatives, had some
effect on the control of malaria in some regions prior to the New Deal.49 On
the other hand, while statistics on the prevalence of malaria before the late
1940s are unreliable, the perception that malaria was a southern problem
remained.
B. Private Enterprise, State Regulation, and Courts
Progressives of the early twentieth century shared a preference for social
planning over laissez-faire, and a commitment to use government as an agency
44

GORDON HARRISON, MOSQUITOES, MALARIA AND MAN 178 (1978).
Id. at 181.
46 The Julius Rosenwald Fund also provided financial support for venereal disease studies in the South
and played an important role in African-American welfare in the 1930s. See Ann W. Fourtner et al., Bad
Blood: A Case Study of the Tuskegee Syphilis Project, 23 J.C. SCI. TEACHING 277 (1994).
47 Bridgforth, supra note 30, at 12 (internal quotation mark omitted).
48 Lawrence J. Nelson, Welfare Capitalism on a Mississippi Plantation in the Great Depression, 50 J.S.
HIST. 225 (1984); see also George F. Paul, Welfare Work on a Delta Plantation, 54 S. WORKMAN 314, 316–18
(1925) (discussing plantation owners’ antimalarial campaign of swamp clearance, cabin inspections, and use of
mosquito netting).
49 See Nelson, supra note 48; see also William A. Link, Privies, Progressivism, and Public Schools:
Health Reform and Education in the Rural South, 1909–1920, 54 J.S. HIST. 623 (1988).
45
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of social welfare. Progressives of all persuasions believed that government
must somehow moderate the economic power that modern industrialism
concentrated into fewer and fewer hands. In the southeastern United States,
progressive public policy measures were rarely initiated through elected
government, as the private philanthropy example illustrates. Importantly, in
the South these private philanthropic efforts were supplemented by business
initiatives.
Public health officials identified railroads early in the twentieth century as
“notorious for their incidental contributions to malaria hazards by creating
conditions favoring the development of Anopheles mosquitoes.”50 Some
railroads responded with eradication measures along their lines, as well as
other efforts to protect the health of both their employees and customers. One
example is the Cotton Belt Railroad’s private campaign against malaria in
Arkansas and Texas. The Cotton Belt, which ran from St. Louis to Texas,
equipped railroad cars to be used as educational vehicles along its routes, and it
also established demonstration farms to educate local residents on eliminating
breeding grounds for mosquitoes.51 Beginning in 1916, the railway’s owners
recognized the need to control malaria on its property. The company
undertook a number of mosquito-eradication measures, including drainage
work and the provision of quinine and wire mesh screens for its employees.52
With assistance from the Arkansas Board of Health, the company provided an
“exhibit car” targeting the general population, especially school children, along
its rail lines to encourage self-protection from malaria.53
Similarly, electric utility companies, which relied upon harnessing the
generating power of running water through building dams, paid some attention
to mosquito abatement in areas of water impoundment. In 1938, for example,
at least four utility companies in southeastern states employed full-time
mosquito-fighting crews.54 In a few states, such sanitation measures were a
requirement of state law, overseen by the state health board or other state
government agency. Local communities also held some authority to supervise
50 R.C. Derivaux, The Relation of the Railroads in the South to the Problem of Malaria and Its Control,
33 PUB. HEALTH REP. 1267, 1267 (1918). A 1938 report on economic conditions in the South noted that “[t]en
railroads in the South listed malaria as an economic problem and a costly liability.” NAT’L EMERGENCY
COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 30.
51 Don L. Hofsommer, St. Louis Southwestern Railway’s Campaign Against Malaria in Arkansas and
Texas, 62 ARK. HIST. Q. 182, 182 (2003).
52 See id. at 182–90.
53 Id. at 190.
54 NAT’L EMERGENCY COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 30.
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land use for sanitation activities, particularly for mosquito control. These
private-enterprise initiatives, however, largely preceded state regulation
efforts. In time, some states would enact land-use regulations requiring
utilities (primarily power companies) to engage in mosquito-control measures
for any water-impoundment activities.55
In a general way, most southern states relied on older legislation forbidding
the pollution of waters, but such laws were of little value without an
enforcement mechanism directed toward the proliferation of mosquitoes. Most
state health departments at the time had general powers to investigate the
conditions of rivers, lakes, and wells, but the more advanced mosquito-control
practices by state health departments (none in the South) required approval of
plans for water supply and sewage disposal, the authority to order changes to
sanitation of impounded water, and other broad authority to make rules.56 In
most southern states, including Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, and
Mississippi, the grant of legislative authority to state boards came only in the
most general terms, and for some time, the constitutionality of state agency
rule making in these areas was in some doubt.57
In Mississippi, for example, the Mississippi Railroad Commission
attempted “to better protect the health of the general traveling public” by
requiring railroads operating within the state to provide mesh screens for all
passenger rail cars.58 The Commission contended that it was authorized by the
legislature to require such measures.59 Various railroad companies, including
the Illinois Central Railway Company, challenged the regulation as beyond the
delegated authority of the Mississippi Railroad Commission, arguing that only
the state health board had authority from the legislature to enact “sanitary
ordinances of this character.”60 The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed:
The order, in its terms, was to safeguard the health of the traveling
public, and while the scientific world now recognize that mosquitoes
are guilty of being the sole disseminators of malaria and yellow fever,
it is also true that this fact was not known when the Railroad
Commission was created and the Code sections referred to were
55 For example, in Wheeler v. River Falls Power Co., 111 So. 907 (Ala. 1926), the Alabama Supreme
Court discussed state health board regulations on water impoundment as a valid delegation of legislative
authority.
56 CHAPIN, supra note 18, at 176.
57 Id. at 72–73.
58 Miss. R.R. Comm’n v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 74 So. 676, 676 (Miss. 1917).
59 Id.
60 Id.
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passed. This being true, it is quite sure that the Legislature did not
have in mind health and sanitation when section 4860 was written.
As before stated, it is possible that wire screens could have been
foreseen when the statute was being considered as contributing to the
comfort of passengers, but it is somewhat difficult to believe that we
were so far ahead of the times that we had already convicted the flies
61
and mosquitoes of manslaughter.

Interestingly, some state courts became arbiters of land-use regulation
through common law nuisance and other tort suits brought by individual
plaintiffs. Such lawsuits targeted utility companies, mills, and railroads for
water-impoundment activities alleged to result in rampant mosquito breeding.
These lawsuits became a form of self-help for local residents in the absence of
a strong state or local regulatory authority.
Beginning in the early twentieth century, courts in southern states
entertained lawsuits for personal injury and nuisance related to man-made
conditions alleged to lead to malaria.62 An example is Godwin v. Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Co., decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1904.63
Elizabeth Godwin alleged that the railroad was responsible for a trench near
her residence that filled with stagnant water, resulting in her husband’s death
from malaria in 1902. Evidence established that the pool of water, some 250
feet from the Godwins’ house, was “polluted and poisonous,” emitting
“noxious and offensive odors, vapors, and smells” including “malaria and
marsh gas.”64 A physician testified that Mr. Godwin had died from malarial
fever. On the other hand, as the opinion notes, “it appeared that in every part
of the city [of Valdosta, Georgia], and in portions thereof remote from the
pool, many other persons, at the time of Mr. Godwin’s illness, suffered from
the same disease.”65 The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, apparently

61

Id. at 676–77.
See, e.g., Burnett v. Ala. Power Co., 74 So. 459 (Ala. 1917); City of Lakeland v. Douglass, 197 So.
467 (Fla. 1940); Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Sims, 65 S.E. 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909); Rice v. Norfolk-S. R.R.
Co., 82 S.E. 1034 (N.C. 1914); Lockhart Power Co. v. Askew, 96 S.E. 685 (S.C. 1918); Chattanooga & Tenn.
River Power Co. v. Lawson, 201 S.W. 165 (Tenn. 1918); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Whitlow, 51 S.E. 182
(Va. 1905). In 1909, the Georgia Court of Appeals listed eight prior cases it termed to be “illustrative” in
which the Georgia Supreme Court had held “public or quasi public corporations liable in damages to private
persons for injury to health through the creation of stagnant ponds or pools or the maintenance of places
favorable to the excessive breeding of mosquitoes.” Towaliga, 65 S.E. at 848.
63 48 S.E. 139 (Ga. 1904).
64 Id. at 139, 140.
65 Id. at 140.
62
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unable to conclude “which of the many causes in existence operated to produce
this sickness, or which of these causes predominated the one over the other.”66
Godwin is noteworthy for the absence of any reference to the then-known
scientific cause of malaria. “Poisons in the air”67 and gases from swamps were
not uncommon beliefs for the cause of malaria throughout the nineteenth
century. The discovery in 1898 of the anopheles mosquito as the carrier of the
disease, noted previously, had not yet become widely known among rural
physicians, let alone among judges and lawyers. The Godwin court noted:
There was much testimony as to the cause of malaria—whether it
was transmitted by air currents, through water, or by mosquitoes; all
of the witnesses testifying, however, that there were various theories
as to its cause, but that it was impossible to say exactly how or by
what it was produced, and as to whether it may not have been
contracted from the same sources which occasioned similar diseases
to persons residing in every part of the city of Valdosta during that
68
year.

On the other hand, a Virginia court in only the following year (1905)
recognized a railroad company’s contention that “malaria is caused by the bite
of a mosquito of the genus anopheles.”69 In 1914, a North Carolina court
asserted: “It is now the accepted doctrine of the medical profession that
malaria is transmitted by the bite of a certain kind of mosquito, anopheles, and
that these mosquitoes are bred in standing water.”70
Interestingly, as knowledge widened of the anopheles mosquito vector for
malaria, plaintiffs seemed to have an easier time winning cases against utility
companies and railroads for land-use activities that resulted in water
impoundment, at least when they could present the case to a jury.71 The jury in
the 1905 Virginia case noted above had sided with the plaintiff in his claim
against the railroad for allowing “stagnant water, decayed vegetation, mud,
66

Id. at 141.
See, e.g., Cent. Ga. Power Co. v. State, 73 S.E. 688, 688 (Ga. Ct. App. 1912) (overruling a demurrer to
a special presentment by a grand jury alleging a power company’s maintenance of a pond produced malaria
and created “poisons in the air, and causing sickness and disease in the community”).
68 Godwin, 43 S.E. at 140.
69 Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Whitlow, 51 S.E. 182, 183 (Va. 1905).
70 Rice v. Norfolk-S. R.R. Co., 82 S.E. 1034, 1036 (N.C. 1914).
71 See, e.g., City of Lakeland v. Douglass, 197 So. 467 (Fla. 1940); Cook v. Attapulgus Clay Co., 184
S.E. 334 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936) (trial court directed verdict for the plaintiff for $10,000); Dance v. City of Rome,
99 S.E. 51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1919) (reversing directed verdict for defendant); Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Foster,
91 S.E. 442 (Ga. Ct. App. 1917); Pruitt v. Bethell, 93 S.E. 945 (N.C. 1917); Rice, 82 S.E. at 1034.
67
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etc., to accumulate and remain upon and along its right of way” near the
plaintiff’s residence, causing his family to become sick with malaria.72 The
trial court had instructed the jury that they could find for the plaintiff if they
believed that the stagnant water “was the principal and substantive cause of the
injury complained of, even though other causes may have contributed to a
lesser extent.”73 The Virginia Court of Appeals ordered a new trial on the
ground that the jury had been incorrectly instructed on the issue of causation.74
The court noted that conditions on the plaintiff’s property, including areas
surrounding a spring, an excavation near the dwelling, and an icehouse, “were
equally, if not more, favorable for the development of the malarial mosquito,
than the conditions about the canal bed.”75
Back in Georgia, now recognizing the anopheles mosquito as the cause of
malaria, the court of appeals in 1909 reluctantly affirmed a jury verdict against
a power company for creating conditions alleged to have caused malaria in a
tenant family living near a stream dammed for electrical generation.76 The
plaintiff argued that the Towaliga Falls Power Company, which had erected a
dam across the Towaliga River near his residence in 1906, caused the malaria
suffered by his family.77 The Georgia court noted that private corporations
authorized by the legislature to exercise eminent domain to condemn rights of
way and erect dams often created “inconveniences and annoyances.”78 But
those results were to a great extent “covered in legal contemplation by the
legislative grant, and are not nuisances,” according to the court.79 Moreover,
[i]n a state like ours, with its many undeveloped resources, with its
hundreds of streams running from the hills to the sea, and wasting on
their way a wealth of energy which ought to be harnessed with
machinery and made to serve the public good, it would be contrary to
the very purpose for which the state itself was organized to
allow . . . a small amount of private annoyance and inconvenience to
80
stand in the way of development.

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Whitlow, 51 S.E. at 182.
Id. at 183.
Id. at 184.
Id. at 183.
Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Sims, 65 S.E. 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 847.
Id.
Id. at 848.
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Nonetheless, the Georgia court affirmed the jury verdict against the power
company, without disguising its preference in the matter: “[W]e gravely doubt
that the jury reached the right result . . . .”81
Other courts were more hospitable to claims of malaria caused by the landuse activities of railroads and utilities, including a South Carolina court’s
approval of an additional $2,000 for an eminent domain condemnation on
account of depreciation in value because a pond “would bring mosquitoes,
malaria, chills, and fever.”82 The court noted, “If this element of damage is
reasonably certain to arise from the ponding of water on respondent’s land,
there is no sound reason why it should not be included now in his
compensation.”83
These personal injury and nuisance decisions from southern courts merit
further evaluation. It may be, for example, that such cases represented a
significant form of land-use regulation, and that power companies and
railroads undertook mosquito-abatement activities on their properties primarily
from fear of such litigation. But for the purposes of this Article, the following
observations, at least, are significant: (1) Judges, lawyers, and juries
encountered “self-help” efforts by land owners and tenants alleging that
railroads and power companies had created conditions causing malaria; (2)
courts employed common law doctrines to resolve these disputes, frequently in
the plaintiffs’ favor; (3) defendant corporations typically asserted that malaria
was ubiquitous in the region and therefore likely was caused from some other
water source; and (4) these public proceedings further spread knowledge in
rural communities about the causes of malaria.

81
82
83

Id. at 850.
Lockhart Power Co. v. Askew, 96 S.E. 685, 686–87 (S.C. 1918).
Id. at 687.
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II. FEDERAL HEALTH INTERVENTION IN THE NEW DEAL ERA
[M]uch of our trouble today and in the past few years has been due
to a lack of understanding of the elementary principles of justice and
fairness . . . .
84
—Franklin D. Roosevelt (1934)

The U.S. Public Health Service, with a primary mission to prevent
contagious diseases entering the country via immigration and trade, began to
use its expertise in the late nineteenth century to attack epidemics occurring
within the United States. One example was an epidemic of yellow fever in
New Orleans, whose termination was claimed by the Public Health Service by
means of mosquito control.85
Indeed, yellow fever was the primary impetus for the organization of health
boards in the 1870s in southern coastal regions. State and local health
authorities had inspection and quarantine authority, but efforts at sanitation and
draining were haphazard, usually coinciding only with a recent outbreak of
yellow fever.86 Voluntary associations of southern health officials sought to
organize region-wide responses to yellow fever epidemics, but with one shortlived exception, no interstate efforts emerged.87
Yellow fever epidemics in the South caught the attention of Congress in
1879. Proponents of a national quarantine measure, known as the Yellow
Fever Bill, justified the federal government’s intervention under its
constitutional right to regulate commerce and to protect the country from
foreign “invader[s].”88
Opponents of the bill argued that it was
unconstitutional and a violation of state rights.89
Ultimately, a much weaker bill, one that satisfied some opponents of
federal power, created the National Board of Health. The Board’s functions
were limited to advising state and local boards of health, publishing health
information, and investigating public health questions. Even with the
weakened version, health officials in Louisiana, Georgia, and Alabama

84 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address (June 28, 1934), reprinted in FDR’s FIRESIDE CHATS 48
(Russell D. Buhite & David W. Levy eds., 1992).
85 HUMPHREYS, supra note 31, at 69.
86 Warner, supra note 30, at 407–08.
87 Id. at 409, 411–12.
88 Id. at 412.
89 Id.
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objected to the National Board’s “interference” in local affairs.90 A memorial
to Congress from Alabama stated that it was “neither wise nor prudent for us to
intrust the administration of quarantine to the hands of any other health
authorities than those who are of our own appointment and directly responsible
to our own people.”91 Further, “the State can not afford to allow this large
grant of power, so nearly affecting the welfare of our people, to be placed in
the hands of the National Board of Health, or of any other agent of the federal
government.”92 Congress permitted the Board to expire in 1883 at the
conclusion of its initial appropriations.93
Although the National Health Board was short-lived, it did set a precedent
for future public health efforts by the federal government. Congress had given
the Board authority to provide money to state and local health boards “and to
assume quarantine powers when states did not appear competent or willing to
do so.”94 As a condition of receipt of federal funds, state and local agencies
were required to adopt uniform standards (provided by the Board) for yellow
fever quarantine actions.95 One historian concluded that “[t]here was
considerable confusion among state and local boards over the limitations of the
National Board’s powers,” providing as an example that the “National Board
could not intervene until local boards had submitted itemized requests for
funds.”96 Future federal grants to state health agencies, likewise, would often
condition receipt of funds for specified uses or with conditions attached.
By 1893, the Marine Hospital Service (later to be renamed the U.S. Public
Health Service)97 was given explicit statutory authorization to use interstate
and quarantine powers to prevent the introduction and spread of cholera,
yellow fever, smallpox, and plague, with jurisdiction soon extended to include
quarantine powers for all infectious and contagious diseases. These powers
were to be exercised “in cooperation” with state and local health agencies.98
Outside of these limited yellow fever and quarantine activities, the federal
government had little to do with public health initiatives within states. But this
90

Id. at 413.
Id. at 426 (quoting Jerome Cochrane et al., TRANSACTIONS OF THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION
STATE OF ALABAMA 124 (1880)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Id. (quoting Cochrane et al., supra note 91, at 124) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93 Id. at 413.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id. at 414.
97 Id.
98 Act of Feb. 15, 1893, ch. 114, § 3, 27 Stat. 449, 450.
91
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picture would begin to change in the early decades of the twentieth century.
The U.S. Public Health Service, created by Congress in 1912 as a renamed
version of the earlier Marine Hospital Service,99 asked Congress in 1914 for
funds to control malaria in the United States.100 But malaria—chronic and
endemic in the poverty-stricken, rural South—was a problem addressed by
state and local health boards, not the federal government, until the New Deal
era.
Prior to World War I, the U.S. Public Health Service began to assist states
in reporting cases of malaria, a process requiring malaria surveys and
authentication by blood exams.101 Accordingly, the field investigations by
federal authorities, in cooperation with state health authorities, included
collection of data, field surveys, laboratory and biologic studies, and education
campaigns with malaria-control demonstrations.
However, the actual
mosquito-eradication operations were the responsibility of the states.102
The onset of World War I brought with it greater federal involvement in
malaria control in the South. Military camps were quickly established there,
and malaria-control activities “gained a new priority in preparations for the
defense of the nation.”103 The U.S. military requested the Public Health
Service’s assistance with sanitation activities around its camps.104 Strict
jurisdictional limits were set, with this jurisdiction justified as a war
emergency. Federal health officials could operate within a one-mile radius of
the camps and industrial plants where malaria was likely to occur.105 But these
federal officials did not undertake direct sanitation efforts; rather, they worked
through the state and local health departments.106 Any specific federal focus in

99

Act of Aug. 14, 1912, ch. 288, 37 Stat. 309 (repealed 1944). The U.S. Public Health Service was
authorized in 1912, among other tasks, to “study and investigate the diseases of man and conditions
influencing the propagation and spread thereof . . . and . . . issue information in the form of publications for the
use of the public.” Id. § 1, 37 Stat. at 309.
100 The History of Malaria, an Ancient Disease, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/malaria/about/history (last updated Feb. 8, 2010).
101 Mary Helen McClanahan, The Origin and Administrative Development of the Office of Malaria
Control in War Areas 5–6 (May 16, 1958) (unpublished B.B.A. thesis, Emory University) (on file with
Woodruff Library, Emory University).
102 Id.
103 Id. at 7.
104 Id. at 8.
105 Id. at 9.
106 Id.
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malarial areas was short-lived, however, as all public health officials—federal,
state, and local—were soon overwhelmed by the Spanish Flu pandemic.107
The U.S. Public Health Service also organized the “Second Annual
Antimalaria Conference” for state and local health officials, held at Louisville,
Kentucky, in November 1920.108 L.M. Fisher, a sanitary engineer with the
Public Health Service, emphasized the necessity for regional cooperation, “to
induce the doing of more and more and still more malaria-control work until
the whole remaining section of the country in which malaria is prevalent shall
have been cleaned up.”109 State and local health agencies, however, were not
at the time “prepared to undertake it, or even to give adequate assistance.”110
Urging even greater federal assistance (and thus, writing for a political
audience), Fisher noted: “The Nation and the State are therefore both interested
in its solution, and should both be actively engaged in working out the
problem; the efforts of the one should supplement those of the other.”111
Further, Fisher continued, “I believe that sooner or later the Nation will
recognize its obligation to assist that portion of the country where malaria is
present, not alone out of considerations of philanthropy but because it is good
business.”112
The Great Depression, which exacerbated health problems already evident
in the South, became the impetus for Roosevelt’s New Deal. Roosevelt’s first
one hundred days in office set in motion various measures to attack
unemployment and stabilize the economy. The increase in federal spending
during Roosevelt’s early years in office would result by 1936 in the first time
that non-wartime federal spending surpassed state and local government
spending.113 A large number of civilians employed through the various New
Deal programs (notably lacking in coordination) dug ditches or engaged in

107 The Spanish Flu pandemic, occurring in the midst of World War I, had killed an estimated twenty
million people worldwide by 1918. Steven Burg, Wisconsin and the Great Spanish Flu Epidemic of 1918, 84
WIS. MAG. HIST. 36, 39 (2000). The United States was particularly hard hit in 1918. In Wisconsin alone, for
example, 103,000 persons contracted the disease, and 8,459 died from it in a four-month period. Id. at 38.
108 U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., PUBLIC HEALTH BULLETIN NO. 115, TRANSACTIONS OF THE SECOND
ANNUAL ANTIMALARIA CONFERENCE OF SANITARY ENGINEERS AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN MALARIA FIELD
INVESTIGATIONS AND MOSQUITO CONTROL (1921).
109 L.M. Fisher, The Organization of Malaria-Control Division in State Board of Health, in U.S. PUB.
HEALTH. SERV., supra note 108, at 65.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 66.
112 Id. at 67.
113 Amity Shlaes, THE FORGOTTEN MAN: A NEW HISTORY OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 266 (2007).
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other draining efforts to combat malaria in the South where, during the Great
Depression, well over one million cases of malaria occurred.114
But southern states were slow to take federal money.115 As Walter Wilbur
noted in 1934, for the southern states “[t]o incur obligations for the relief of
distress, especially where the distress was prevailingly of a chronic type, was a
violent innovation in political practice.”116 In the early years of the New Deal,
public opinion was “sharply divided as to whether any special measures for
meeting unemployment were ever needed,” and whether federal money had not
“done more harm than good.”117 Nonetheless, Wilbur reported that under the
Federal Relief Administration, “progress has been made in a frontal attack on
the health problems of the Southern area,” with special emphasis on malaria,
hookworm, and community sanitation.118
At the same time, an article entitled Health in the New Deal, also written in
1934, mentioned neither malaria nor the South specifically in its call for a
national public health program.119 The author, the chief statistician of the U.S.
Public Health Service, urged instead the recognition of “a fundamental change
in the objectives of ‘public health.’”120 Further, he contended that “[t]he policy
of placing the responsibility for public health upon communities and
states . . . has failed ignominiously.”121 An invigorated national health service,
with national jurisdiction, was needed. New Deal efforts to date, including
sanitary projects supervised by the Public Health Service as part of the federal
work relief program, as well as small appropriations to states for rural
sanitation and maternal and infant health, were inadequate.122 “So far,” the
author noted, “efforts to get the Federal Government to do for public health
what it has done for education, agriculture, and roads have been
unsuccessful.”123 But this broader concept of a federal role in health, the
author was quick to note, was “not an appeal for ‘public medicine’ or ‘state

114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

HUMPHREYS, supra note 31, at 2.
Wilbur, supra note 1, at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 54.
Sydenstricker, supra note 7.
Id. at 134.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 135–36.
Id. at 135.
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medicine’ or ‘socialized medicine’ or any particular scheme of furnishing
medical care through public provision.”124
Public health as a significant federal agency presence in the South emerged,
first, from these programs for the unemployed, through grants to state
governments, and second, from the government’s increasing relationships with
war industries. Of course, an alert historian of public policy will be quick to
note the many ways in which the federal government already did intervene in
the economy, from agricultural inspections to patent regulation. Moreover,
mosquito-control efforts undertaken with federal dollars were at the discretion
and under the control of state and local governments.
New Deal programs embodied no single approach to political management
of the economy, and the same would be true with respect to public health. One
observer believed that “[a]lmost every New Deal agency, temporary or
permanent . . . made some contribution to health.”125 Like Roosevelt’s
economic approach, the malaria-eradication project experienced similar New
Deal methods of pragmatic experimentation. Various New Deal federal
agencies (the Civil Works Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief
Administration, and the Works Progress Administration) drained some two
million acres of swamp land, although the haphazard, uncoordinated nature of
the early efforts, along with a lack of maintenance of those areas, make the
long-term results difficult to gauge.126
The first significant, comprehensive federal effort to control malaria on a
regional basis was in connection with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),
but Works Progress Administration projects also allocated some employment
opportunities to “sanitation” efforts—primarily drainage projects to control
mosquito breeding areas.127 The TVA began damming streams for flood
control, hydroelectric power, and navigation. For Norris Dam alone, the TVA
would flood over 153,000 acres of land.128 Recognizing the hazard of
increased malarial breeding grounds from such activities, the TVA hired

124

Id. at 134.
Breeden, supra note 13, at 18 (quoting JOHN DUFFY, THE HEALERS: THE RISE OF THE MEDICAL
ESTABLISHMENT 317 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
126 Id.
127 See Elizabeth Fee & Theodore M. Brown, Depression-Era Malaria Control in the South, 94 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 1694, 1694 (2004).
128 Shlaes, supra note 113, at 176–77.
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scientists and engineers to engage in mosquito control, and the research and
techniques employed by these experts would be used later by the MCWA.129
Beginning in the early 1930s, the TVA, together with the U.S. Public
Health Service, played a vital role in malaria control operations in the area
under the jurisdiction of the TVA, primarily in Alabama and Tennessee.
Mosquito breeding sites were reduced by controlling water levels and applying
larvicide.130 New Deal officials deemed the malaria control and assessment
activities associated with the TVA to be a major commitment.131
Nonetheless, the 1930s saw a rise in rates of malaria in the southeastern
United States.132 One cause for this rise may have been better reporting, but
the various New Deal efforts to battle malaria did not have any dramatic effect
in lessening its prevalence, and in some areas malaria incidence had even
seemed to increase. Georgia, for example, accounted for one-sixth of all
deaths in the United States from malaria in 1936.133
But both federal officials and state health departments had to convince
physicians that receipt of federal funds to combat malaria was not the
beginning of “socialized medicine.”134 One physician at a state medical
association meeting described the “excited talk” among physicians there
“concerning state medicine”—proposals that would mean assumption by
government “of those duties in the prevention, treatment, and alleviation of
disease usually delegated to individuals who have been prepared and certified
for this purpose.”135 These were “revolutionary proposals” coming from
“outside the ranks of medicine.”136 Moreover, the speaker said, federal help
especially should be reserved only for emergencies.137

129

Duffy, supra note 17, at 29, 47.
The History of Malaria, an Ancient Disease, supra note 100.
131 David E. Lilienthal, TVA: DEMOCRACY ON THE MARCH 73–74 (1953).
132 According to the U.S. Army Office of Medical History, the “last rise of malaria prevalence in this
country to epidemic proportions occurred in the mid-thirties . . . probably as a direct effect of the depression.”
Justin M. Andrews & Jean S. Grant, Malaria Incidence in the United States Before World War II, in 6
COMMUNICABLE DISEASES: MALARIA 61, 61 (John Boyd Coates et al. eds., 1963), available at
http://history.amedd.army.mil/booksdocs/wwii/Malaria/chapterIII.htm.
133 EVELYN WARD GAY, THE MEDICAL PROFESSION IN GEORGIA 1733–1983, at 345 (1983).
134 Bridgforth, supra note 30, at 13; see also GAY, supra note 133, at 342–43.
135 GAY, supra note 133, at 347 (internal quotation mark omitted).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 348.
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A. Creation of the Federal Security Agency
In Franklin Roosevelt’s first term of office, thirty new federal agencies
came into being. One critic at the time alleged that nearly all of these were too
“close to the executive,” and the proliferation of new agencies “bewildered”
the average citizen.138 Roosevelt’s efforts to reorganize the administrative arm
of the Executive Branch followed on the heels of the “Second New Deal”
legislative efforts in 1935.139 This Second New Deal addressed the continuing
economic problems of the nation. As David Kennedy has written about the
overall pattern of the Second New Deal, in the social realm “the dominant
motif was security; in the economic realm, regulation (which was security by
another name); and in the physical realm, planned development.”140
In 1937, the White House proposed a “Reorganization Act,” seeking a
dramatic expansion of the President’s authority with respect to the newly
created agencies. Among other things, the 1937 bill would have expanded the
presidential staff, integrated executive agencies into a single presidential
office, and raised all independent agencies into existing Cabinet departments.
Roosevelt urged that this legislation was necessary to accomplish the goals of
the earlier New Deal legislation:
Individual or local or state effort alone cannot protect us in 1937 any
better than ten years ago. It will take time—and plenty of time—to
work out our remedies administratively even after legislation is
passed. To complete our program of protection in time, therefore, we
cannot delay one moment in making certain that our national
141
government has power to carry through.

Congress tabled the bill amid mounting concerns about the extension of
presidential authority.
Two years later, Roosevelt was successful. The Reorganization Act of
1939142 was said to be the first major, planned reorganization of the Executive
Branch of U.S. government since 1787. This Act permitted the President to
reorganize the Executive Branch, within certain limits. The Reorganization

138

Shlaes, supra note 113, at 230.
The Second New Deal is described in ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM
IN RECESSION AND WAR (1995).
140 KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 247.
141 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address (Mar. 9, 1937), reprinted in FDR’s FIRESIDE CHATS, supra note
84, at 86.
142 Pub. L. No. 19, 53 Stat. 561.
139
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Act immediately caused concern that it delegated far too much power to the
President. It passed narrowly, only after amendment in both houses of
Congress to add “efficiency” and “economy” as the official goals of the bill.143
Opponents of the Reorganization Act characterized it as a move toward
dictatorship. Senator Millard Tydings, for example, stated: “The radio these
days is full of appeals for democracy, appeals against the totalitarian States.
Yet, while we are condemning these authoritarian States, we are, bit by bit,
adopting their methods, which we condemn.”144
Less than three weeks after passage of the Reorganization Act, on April 25,
1939, Roosevelt presented to Congress “Reorganization Plan No. I.”145 While
designed to reduce the number of agencies reporting directly to the President,
this plan dramatically extended presidential control over the Executive Branch.
It also substantially reorganized a number of federal agencies.
The most important element of this plan was the creation of a new,
Cabinet-level Federal Security Agency (FSA). This new agency brought
together the Social Security Board, U.S. Employment Service, Office of
Education (later the U.S. Department of Education), the Civilian Conservation
Corps, the Food and Drug Administration, and the U.S. Public Health Service,
which was formerly under the Treasury Department.
Unlike today’s Department of Homeland Security, the use of the term
“security” for the FSA meant primarily the domestic welfare of citizens. This
use was of a piece with Roosevelt’s second inaugural address in 1937, in
which he said, “We refused to leave the problems of our common welfare to be
solved by the winds of chance and the hurricanes of disaster.”146 Government
expansion was necessary to address the problems of “one-third of a nation illhoused, ill-clad, ill-nourished.”147 Roosevelt continued: “Nearly all of us
recognize that as intricacies of human relations increase, so power to govern
them must also increase—power to stop evil; power to do good. . . . [W]e have
undertaken to erect on the old foundations a more enduring structure for the
better use of future generations.”148 This undertaking, Roosevelt stressed,

143

Reorganizing Bill Is Passed by House by Vote of 246-153, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1939, at 1.
Spending Foes Put Senate on Record, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1939, at 13.
145 Reorganization Plan No. I, 53 Stat. 1423 (1939).
146 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937), available at http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/20th_century/froos2.asp.
147 Id.
148 Id.
144
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would “fashion[] an instrument of unimagined power for the establishment of a
morally better world.”149
Figure 1:
Flag depicting the seal of the Federal Security Agency, created in 1939

As the official “seal” represents (see Figure 1 above), the FSA combined an
unprecedented number of government functions and exhibited sprawling legal
powers. The FSA held responsibility for matters involving (among others)
social security, education, drug regulation, protection of the food supply, civil
defense, and later, running the camps where Japanese-Americans were interned
and conducting biological weapons research.150 Its important legacy was to
coax the public to accept a broader conception of “security” that held the
prospect of more thoroughly protecting programs important to the Roosevelt
Administration.

149
150

Id.
See id. at pt. 2.
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The key concept espoused by Roosevelt was that a strong domestic
“security” was necessary to face the international threats posed by the war in
Europe. The FSA pervasively mixed domestic regulatory and national defense
functions both before and after World War II, and the Office of Malaria
Control in War Areas, discussed below, is a prime example of this.
Roosevelt’s message to Congress on the Reorganization Act of 1939
emphasized these themes: “In these days of ruthless attempts to destroy
democratic governments, it is baldly asserted that democracies must always be
weak in order to be democratic at all; and that, therefore, it will be easy to
crush all free states out of existence.”151 Roosevelt stated that this Act would
allow him to introduce “modern means of administrative management.”152
Similarly, in a Fireside Chat radio address, Roosevelt explained his
reorganization proposal:
For many years we have all known that the Executive and
Administrative departments of the government in Washington are a
higgledy-piggledy patchwork of duplicate responsibilities and
overlapping powers. The reorganization of this vast government
machinery which I proposed to the Congress last winter does not
conflict with the principle of the democratic process, as some people
153
say. It only makes that process work more efficiently.

Professor Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar has examined the origins of the FSA,
exploring in particular why the agency combined domestic regulatory and

151 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress on the Reorganization Act (Apr. 25, 1939), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15748.
152 Id. Roosevelt stated in his message to Congress on the Reorganization Plan:

Forty years ago in 1899 President McKinley could deal with the whole machinery of the
Executive Branch through his eight cabinet secretaries and the heads of two commissions; and
there was but one commission of the so-called quasi-judicial type in existence. He could keep in
touch with all the work through eight or ten persons.
Now, forty years later, not only do some thirty major agencies (to say nothing of the minor
ones) report directly to the President, but there are several quasi-judicial bodies which have
enough administrative work to require them also to see him on important executive matters.
It has become physically impossible for one man to see so many persons, to receive reports
directly from them, and to attempt to advise them on their own problems which they submit. In
addition the President today has the task of trying to keep their programs in step with each other
or in line with the national policy laid down by the Congress. And he must seek to prevent
unnecessary duplication of effort.
Id.
153 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Address (Oct. 12, 1937), reprinted in FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT,
THE FIRESIDE CHATS OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT 76 (2008).
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national defense functions both before and after World War II.154 As Professor
Cuéllar notes, how the Executive Branch defines national security is key to its
assertion of power, as we have seen with the response to the 9/11 terrorist
attacks.155 The article cogently documents how the Roosevelt White House
promoted a broad conception of “security” that held the prospect of more
thoroughly protecting domestic programs important to the Administration.156
Although the article does not address the MCWA or its placement within the
U.S. Public Health Service, this wartime agency is a good illustration of
Roosevelt’s broad notion of domestic “security.”
Under Roosevelt’s Reorganization Plan, the U.S. Public Health Service
would be moved from the Treasury Department to the FSA. Although the
Public Health Service was only one agency of the many larger organizations
brought under the umbrella of the FSA, Roosevelt specifically explained to
Congress the rationale for this change:
The Public Health Service is transferred from the Treasury
Department to the Federal Security Agency. It is obvious that the
health activities of the Federal Government may be better carried out
when so grouped than if they are left in the Treasury, which is
primarily a fiscal agency, and where the necessary relationships with
other social security, employment and educational activities now
must be carried on by an elaborate scheme of interdepartmental
157
committee work.

The U.S. Public Health Service could in some respects substitute for the failure
of Roosevelt’s aim to include a national health insurance scheme in the Social
Security Act of 1935.158 Opposition from the American Medical Association

154 Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, “Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal
Security Agency, 1939–1953, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 587 (2009).
155 See id. at 596. The tendency of war to expand executive power under the United States Constitution,
temporarily or permanently, is a topic much explored in law review scholarship. See, e.g., William Michael
Treanor, The War Powers Outside the Courts, 81 IND. L.J. 1333, 1341 (2006) (“While one can trace a general
expansion of executive power in the war powers area—and this is certainly the case in the years since the
Second World War—that expansion has been highly (if episodically) contested by Congress. Thus, this is not
the type of situation in which one can say that we the people have evolved to a new consensus that alters the
constitutional framework.”).
156 See Cuéllar, supra note 154.
157 Roosevelt, supra note 151.
158 KENNEDY, supra note 8, at 271. The Social Security Act became law on August 14, 1935. The Act
“provided for unemployment insurance and old-age pensions, its principal features, and also authorized nearly
$50 million in federal grants to the states for the immediate relief of the indigent elderly, another $25 million
for Aid to Dependent Children, and modest sums for public health services.” Id.
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to “socialized medicine” ensured the defeat of this aspect of Roosevelt’s
security plan.
Although Roosevelt’s hoped-for medical care program was not included in
the Social Security Act, he continued to pursue a federal health insurance
program by establishing a committee of government experts to study this issue.
The Interdepartmental Committee to Coordinate Health and Welfare Activities
issued a report in early 1938 calling for, among other recommendations,
federal grants to the states “toward the costs of a general medical care
program.”159 This general medical care program envisioned the U.S. Public
Health Service taking on a new role in administering health care delivery in the
United States.160 Viewing this proposal as the start of a national health care
system, the American Medical Association adopted a resolution rejecting this
recommendation.161 The Committee’s recommendations became the basis of a
bill introduced in the Senate, but the proposal never made its way out of the
Senate Finance Committee.162 Roosevelt was unable to push national health
insurance as a legislative priority in his remaining years as President.
Dedicating the National Institute of Health163 in Bethesda, Maryland, in
1940, Roosevelt said:
Although we have still much to do, the nation today, I am very
certain, is better prepared to meet the public health problems of our
emergency than at any previous time in the history of the
country. . . .
The Public Health Service of the United States is a very old
institution and has done magnificent work, but it is only recently, in
the past few years, that the Federal Government has indicated that it
can do infinitely more. Disease disregards State as well as national
lines and among the States there is, as we know, an inequality of
opportunity for health. In such cases the Public Health Service is
164
helping and must continue even more greatly to help.

159 Background, Report of the Technical Committee on Medical Care, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.
gov/history/reports/Interdepartmental.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
160 Lynne Page Snyder, A New Mandate for Public Health, 109 PUB. HEALTH REP. 469, 470 (1994).
161 Background, Report of the Technical Committee on Medical Care, supra note 159.
162 Id.
163 A Short History of the National Institutes of Health, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, http://history.nih.gov/
exhibits/history/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). Originally singular, the NIH was renamed in the plural, National
Institutes of Health, by Congress in 1948 to reflect the inclusion of additional organizations within the NIH
umbrella. Id.
164 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at the Dedication of the National Institute of Health, Bethesda,
Maryland (Oct. 31, 1940), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=15888&st=&st1.
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B. The Public Health Service Act of 1944
Federal activity in public health grew throughout the twentieth century, but
especially after the early years of the New Deal. Structurally, the creation of
the FSA allowed for a more prominent role for the U.S. Public Health Service
in Roosevelt’s agenda. Congress assisted this transformation with the Public
Health Service Act of 1944.165 The Act is said to be the “modern statutory
basis for federal power in a health crisis,”166 limited though that authority may
be by the continuation of primary state obligations for the health of its citizens.
Legislative activity resulting in the 1944 Act grew out of concerns for
health needs in the mobilization for World War II.167 The Act reorganized the
U.S. Public Health Service within the FSA and brought together under one title
most of the existing laws affecting the Service.168 Congress no longer faced
appropriations for public health work through “a half-dozen subcommittees
and transfers of funds from other agencies,” a result that addressed the concern
of “disjointed policy making.”169 Congress specifically authorized the Public
Health Service to “furnish any materials, supplies, or equipment, or perform
any work or services requested by the Federal Security Agency.”170
Noteworthy throughout is the direction by Congress that the U.S. Public
Health Service’s role was primarily to “assist” states in addressing health
concerns. Under the subtitle “Federal-State Cooperation,” for example, the
Surgeon General was directed to
assist States and their political subdivisions in the prevention and
suppression of communicable diseases, [to] cooperate with and aid
State and local authorities in the enforcement of their quarantine and
other health regulations . . . , and [to] advise the several States on
matters relating to the preservation and improvement of the public
171
health.

165 Public Health Service Act, ch. 373, 58 Stat. 682 (1944) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201–300
(2006)).
166 John Thomas Clarkson, Note, Phase Six Pandemic: A Call to Re-Evaluate Federal Quarantine
Authority Before the Next Catastrophic Outbreak, 44 GA. L. REV. 803, 816 (2010).
167 Philip R. Lee, Reinventing the Public Health Service: A Look in a 5-Year-Old Mirror, 109 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 466, 466 (1994).
168 Public Health Service Act, 1944, 59 PUB. HEALTH REP. 916, 916 (1944).
169 Snyder, supra note 160, at 470.
170 Public Health Service Act § 327.
171 Id. § 311.
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The Act expanded grants and services to states, directing the Surgeon General
to establish specific programs to address tuberculosis and venereal disease.172
Congress included an appropriation of $20 million annually for state and local
health departments to “maintain[] adequate public health services,” a
substantial increase over amounts previously available.173
In several respects, however, the 1944 Act broadened the scope of federal
government power in public health. The millions of dollars newly available to
aid state and local health efforts came with strings attached. The Surgeon
General could issue regulations relating to the purpose of the grant
(tuberculosis treatment protocols, for example), conditioning the receipt of the
grant upon the state’s compliance with its directions. Prior to issuing any such
regulations, the Surgeon General was to consult with state health authorities, at
least “insofar as practicable.”174
Federal health authority with respect to quarantine was also expanded by
the Act. The federal government’s quarantine authority had been a frequent
source of conflict with state and local governments, particularly in port areas,
throughout the nineteenth century and into the early decades of the
twentieth.175 Prior federal quarantine law emanated from the theory that the
federal government was responsible for customs and immigration control at the
nation’s borders.176 In the 1944 Act, by contrast, the federal government’s
quarantine power was clarified to extend to interstate transmission of
communicable diseases, presumably under a Commerce Clause theory.177 The
Act authorized the Surgeon General (with the approval of the FSA
administrator) to “make and enforce such regulations as in his judgment are
necessary to prevent the introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable
diseases from foreign countries into the States” as well as “from one State or
possession into any other State or possession.”178 The statutory language
invited broader authority to attack the conditions under which an epidemic

172

Id. § 314.
Id.
174 Id.
175 See generally Felice Batlan, Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power and Quarantines Past
and Future, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 53 (2007) (describing historical conflicts between state, local, and federal
governments over quarantine).
176 H.R.J. Res. 42, 39th Cong. (1866). In 1866, Congress had authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to
issue regulations it “deemed necessary and proper, in aid of State or municipal authorities” with respect to
quarantine. Id.
177 Public Health Service Act § 311.
178 Id. § 361.
173
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might spread within the nation. Indeed, a writer summarizing the 1944 Act in
Public Health Reports, a weekly publication of the Office of the Surgeon
General, identified “the trend of public health work” to be “the eradication of
widely prevalent diseases which place an unnecessary burden upon the health
and economy of the Nation.”179
This broadened statutory authority was really a congressional ratification of
the many new public health efforts during the New Deal and the mobilization
for World War II.180 As described in Part III below, the Office of Malaria
Control in War Areas was already engaged in direct interventions within states
well before the Public Health Service Act of 1944, under the authority of a
national security mandate coordinated with the U.S. Army. The 1944 Act
confirmed this authority through section 604, “Appropriations for Emergency
Health and Sanitation Activities.”181 Without specifically mentioning malaria
or the MCWA (which had by then been in existence for two years), this section
nonetheless confirmed a statutory basis for the MCWA’s activities, authorizing
appropriations for the Surgeon General “to conduct health and sanitation
activities in areas adjoining military or naval reservations within or without the
United States, in areas where there are concentrations of military or naval
forces, in Government and private industrial plans engaged in defense work,
and in areas adjoining such industrial plants.”182 Importantly, such activities
were authorized “either directly or through State health authorities.”183
Funding for U.S. Public Health Service activities increased during the
Roosevelt years, but even after the Public Health Service Act of 1944 and the
broadened authority it conferred, the U.S. Public Health Service remained on
the sidelines for most health issues facing the American population. In the
southern United States, this relative absence of a federal role changed
dramatically with the onset of World War II and the creation of the MCWA.

179

Public Health Service Act, supra note 168, at 916.
Lynne Page Snyder, Passage and Significance of the 1944 Public Health Service Act, 109 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 721, 721 (1994).
181 Public Health Service Act § 604.
182 Id.
183 Id. (emphasis added).
180
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III. THE OFFICE OF MALARIA CONTROL IN WAR AREAS: NEGOTIATING STATE
AUTHORITY
Nowhere was the domestic function of the FSA more closely and explicitly
aligned to the war effort than in the MCWA. The Office of National Defense
Malaria Control Activities was established in the United States Public Health
Service, now an arm of the FSA, on February 10, 1942. It was renamed the
Office of Malaria Control in War Areas a short time later, on April 27, 1942.
Its location in Atlanta, Georgia, was strategic for malaria control. MCWA’s
responsibilities included fifteen southeastern states, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands.184
As World War II approached, the South was strategically important for
military bases—a great number were established there because of the
possibility of year-round training. In 1942, there were 499 military
installations in the South, and that number would increase to 583 two years
later.185 Because the South became an important host of military bases and
wartime industry, the military had a significant interest in control of malaria
there. The MCWA was a unique agency in its partnership with the military,
charged to address mosquito control in civilian areas around bases and warrelated industries. The MCWA thus was characterized not as a New Deal
priority, but as a wartime necessity.
Neither the Public Health Service nor the MCWA ever had a specific
statutory mandate from Congress to take on malaria work in the United States.
Instead, the agency performed its work through executive delegation and by
congressional appropriation of funds.186

184

McClanahan, supra note 101, at 31.
Justin M. Andrews & Jean S. Grant, Experience in the United States, in 6 COMMUNICABLE DISEASES:
MALARIA, supra note 132, at 61, 61.
186 For examples of congressional budget appropriations for malaria control, see Act of July 3, 1945, Pub.
L. No. 79-124, 59 Stat. 361; Act of Dec. 22, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-529, 58 Stat. 853; Act of June 28, 1944,
Pub. L. No. 78-373, 58 Stat. 547; Act of July 12, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-135, 57 Stat. 494; Act of July 12, 1943,
Pub. L. No. 78-132, 57 Stat. 431; Act of July 2, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-647, 56 Stat. 562; Act of Feb. 21, 1942,
Pub. L. No. 77-463, 56 Stat. 98; Act of July 3, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-150, 55 Stat. 541; Act of July 1, 1941,
Pub. L. No. 77-146, 55 Stat. 466; Act of Mar. 1, 1941, Pub. L. No. 77-9, 55 Stat. 14.
185
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Figure 2:
This chart depicts the organizational structure of the Public Health Service branch
of the Federal Security Agency, after the addition of the MCWA.

The structure and content of this organizational chart (Figure 2 above)
merits consideration. Notice, particularly, the references to state relations, and
the authority established via direct (and dashed) lines with state health
departments. The state health departments, in turn, are shown with direct
authority over the geographic areas surrounding the 1,800 designated “war
establishments” (military bases as well as defense-related industries). The
MCWA itself reported directly to the “Division of State Relations,” which in
turn reported to the “Bureau of State Services” of the U.S. Public Health
Service.187 But during the war, federal employees of the MCWA often worked

187 The U.S. Public Health Service’s Division of State Relations was created in 1936, after it received
funding applications from every state in the nation. The 1935 Social Security Act had made public health
funds available to the states and for the first time had created a permanent mechanism for distributing them.
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directly in areas under state jurisdiction, spraying larvicide and directing
drainage activities.
A. An Expansion of Federal Jurisdiction
In theory, the MCWA’s jurisdiction was limited to a one-mile radius
around the establishments to be protected.188 The one-mile radius restriction,
first practiced in World War I, was thought to be the flight limits of the
anopheles mosquito. In terms of the MCWA’s work, this one-mile
jurisdictional limit was observed more often in the breech, without objection
by state or local authorities. There is no evidence, for example, that any
government officials employed surveyors to demarcate the one-mile circle, nor
are there, apparently, any recorded complaints when MCWA operations
extended outside of these zones.

Federal health expenditures in the South, largely grants in aid from the Public Health Service, had already
increased to just over $4 million in 1930. Breeden, supra note 13, at 15.
188 McClanahan, supra note 101, at 32.
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Figure 3:
MCWA illustration from its report for 1942–43, depicting the mosquito as an
enemy airplane carrying a disease “bomb.” Note the depiction of the MCWA atop
the “superstructure” of state and local health agencies.

This MCWA illustration (Figure 3 above) also merits further consideration
with respect to the depiction of state and local health agencies as its
“superstructure.” To some extent the MCWA continued a legal fiction of
jurisdictional limits associated with the one-mile demarcation. On the other
hand, the MCWA is depicted as the organizing, governing structure for state
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and local health agencies. Moreover, designation of “war establishments” was
a federal, not a state matter.
Military bases were subject to the jurisdiction of the military’s infectious
disease control units, so the military itself handled elimination of mosquitoes
and protection of troops from malaria on each military base. Mosquito
breeding areas, however, surrounded military bases in the South, and in any
event military planners had to account for exposure of soldiers in transit to the
training camps and while on leave. A separate agency was necessary because
neither the federal government nor the military had authority to act in areas
outside of military bases. Thus, the MCWA was given jurisdiction over
“civilian” areas surrounding military bases for malaria control.
War necessity encompassed private industry deemed vital to defense,
further enlarging the jurisdiction of the MCWA within southern states. As
World War II progressed, the FSA increasingly viewed agricultural production
to be an essential war aim, expanding the designated operation area of the
MCWA enormously. Eventually, some 2,000 “war establishments” were
designated, including factories, depots, access highways, and recreational
areas, in addition to military bases.189 Fewer than 600 of these 2,000 “war
establishments” were military posts.190 As the MCWA itself observed in its
annual report for 1942–43, “[T]he immensity of the task has required the
support and expansion of the normal local and state health department facilities
by the United States Public Health Service.”191

189
190
191

Andrews & Grant, supra note 185, at 91.
Id.
U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., MALARIA CONTROL IN WAR AREAS, 1942–43, at 5 (1943).
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Figure 4:
A map of the United States South showing locations of personnel of the MCWA in
1943.

In its annual reports, the MCWA appended a “State Section,” emphasizing
that the MCWA operated within each state “as a cooperative enterprise
between the Public Health Service and the state health department.”192 This
section included letters from the state health department directors for each state
where MCWA operations occurred. The letters, each one page in length,
recounted the accomplishments for the year in acres drained, water surfaces
treated with larvicide, and hours of labor expended.193 Some letters
specifically credited the cumulative achievements to the MCWA, while in
others the credit was implied.194
The U.S. Public Health Service also assigned employees to serve as
“Liaison Officers” between regional Army Service Commands and state health
officials, who operated independently from the MCWA to coordinate federal,

192

Id. at 83.
Id. at 84–92.
194 Compare id. at 85 (letter from Arkansas State Health Officer specifically discussing MCWA’s
achievements in Arkansas the previous year), with id. at 89 (letter from Georgia State Health Officer omitting
mention of MCWA).
193
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state, and local resources in “emergency health work.”195 A history of the
Public Health Service described the Liaison Officers as “free to work in
association with State and local civil authorities in investigating health
conditions and in stimulating the development or improvement of location
health organizations.”196 Liaison Officers were expected to address, among
other problems, venereal and other communicable diseases, sanitation, and
“provision of health and medical services in civilian communities.”197 MCWA
engineers communicated with these Liaison Officers for joint planning of
mosquito-eradication operations.198
By 1953, the MCWA had spent an estimated $100 million for antimalarial
activities.199 Within only one year of its creation, the federal agency employed
4,300 people, including 300 commissioned officers of the U.S. Public Health
Service.200 The great majority of employees were sanitation engineers and
entomologists, who in turn trained state and federal employees in eradication
techniques. The agency reported that it had benefited hundreds of war
establishments, including military, industrial, housing, and recreational
installations, protecting some several million persons in the United States in
connection with the war effort.201 Training in malaria control became one of
the responsibilities of the MCWA.202
One historian recounted:
From the beginning, engineers and entomologists dominated MCWA.
Physicians assessed malaria cases in the field, and parasitologists ran
the laboratory, but major emphasis was always on mosquito control,
the engineers’ specialty. They determined control methods, directed
operations, surveyed and designed drainage construction projects,
and mapped field activities. . . . The wartime need to save time,
money, and equipment dictated that temporary measures like

195

RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE 1789–1950, at 625 (1951).
Id. at 628–29.
197 Id. at 629.
198 U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., supra note 191, at 2.
199 Duffy, supra note 17, at 49.
200 FITZHUGH MULLAN, PLAGUES AND POLITICS: THE STORY OF THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE 125 (1989).
201 Bauer, supra note 4, at 1104.
202 John Parascandola, From MCWA to CDC—Origins of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
111 PUB. HEALTH REP. 549, 549 (1996).
196
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Many of the sanitary engineers and laboratory workers employed by the
MCWA completed a four-week orientation course sponsored by the U.S.
Public Health Service in Bethesda, Maryland.204 The orientation course
emphasized “the unique federal-state relationship for coöperation in public
health activities,” and instructors emphasized the police powers of the state.205
Dr. A.J. McLaughlin, for example, extolled the “ideal relation between federal
and state governments” to be “such as to insure the covering between them of
the entire field of public health.”206 Along the same lines, Lieutenant Stanley
Drexler told attendees:
The most impressive thing about the study of federal legislation
pertaining to public health is the extent to which Congress has leaned
over backward to (a) keep the federal government out of the day-today public health work, (b) keep the public health worker under
control of the states and municipalities, and (c) make the federal
government a center of research, a center for the exchange of ideas,
and a sort of over-all adviser. Much, if not all of the past prestige of
the Public Health Service in the field of federal-state relations has
been contained in the persuasive and coöperative powers of the
207
Service rather than in its legal powers.

The MCWA largely followed the form, but not the function, of the federalism
limitations outlined by Lieutenant Drexler.
The most significant step in the expansion of the MCWA’s jurisdiction
came with official recognition of an “extended malaria control program”
operated by the MCWA. As the war seemed all but concluded, officials
reasoned that the most significant threat of malaria likely would be returning
military personnel who had contracted the disease where they had been
stationed, most notably those returning from the Pacific. Beginning in late
1943, cases of nonindigenous malaria increased sharply in hospitals and
prisoner-of-war camps, and scientists established that malaria acquired abroad
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could be transmitted domestically.208 The MCWA, however, was not
originally authorized to operate beyond war establishments.
Further, with the specter of a rapidly approaching demobilization of
thousands of troops who had served in malarial areas, the problem of malaria
control became a national one. Unless the United States government was
willing to quarantine these returning soldiers from six to nine months after
their return, a malaria epidemic likely could not be contained. Testifying
before Congress, an MCWA official reported that malaria experts had
predicted that over a million malaria carriers would return to the United States
at the conclusion of the war.209
Congress responded by authorizing an “Extended Program” for the
MCWA, along with an appropriation of just over $10 million for “Malaria and
Diseases of Tropical Origin (National Defense).”210 The MCWA now had,
effectively, a national jurisdiction, not restricted to a one-mile radius around
military establishments in areas of endemic malaria. The Medical Director of
the U.S. Public Health Service, Dr. L.L. Williams, Jr., reassured the public that
the returning war veterans did not “pose any new problem; it merely
accentuates the existing civilian problem.”211 To address the problem, Dr.
Williams wrote, the Public Health Service had asked for “an appropriation to
extend the activities of Malaria Control in War Areas.”212 Justifying the
MCWA’s expanded jurisdiction was also, now, the goal to eradicate malaria
throughout the United States. “With the continued cooperation of State health
departments,” Dr. Williams claimed, “this program will be successful.”213
B. The Use of DDT for Mosquito Control
An important addition to the MCWA’s arsenal was the introduction of
DDT for civilian use toward the close of World War II. Developed by the U.S.
Army for use in war zones during World War II, DDT’s reputation for
mosquito control was thought in 1945 to be “the War’s greatest contribution to
the future health of the world.”214 DDT killed adult mosquitoes for lengthy
208
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periods and was usually sprayed on the walls of buildings.215 Time, Reader’s
Digest, and Better Homes and Gardens ran laudatory articles on DDT, calling
it “one of the great scientific discoveries of World War II.”216 The upsurge in
public interest in DDT as a pesticide led to the Army’s decision to release it for
civilian use at the conclusion of the war.217 Although concerns about DDT’s
potential impact on human health and the environment existed, the federal
government would not ban most uses of DDT in the United States until
1972.218
Prior to its public availability, however, the MCWA played a key role in
introducing DDT for mosquito control in civilian areas. The MCWA acquired
DDT supplies from the military and began spraying the interiors of houses in
areas with identified malaria morbidity.219 In 1944, the first year of the
program, the MCWA oversaw DDT spraying in over half a million homes in
the South. By the late 1940s, over one million homes per year would be
sprayed. The spraying program ended in 1951.220
The availability of DDT for civilian use furthered the transition to the
MCWA “extended program” at the conclusion of the war.221 The threat of
outbreaks from returning war veterans, it was argued, could more easily be
controlled by treating the interiors of homes and public buildings with DDT
than by larviciding and drainage. Congress appropriated funds for this
purpose, with locations determined by the MCWA based upon malaria rates.
There was “no uniform method of securing the State and local
participation.”222 One study noted that the “incidental fly control” resulting
from DDT spraying—meaning ordinary household pests also fell victim to
DDT—was one of the “major factors in the ready acceptance and the success
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of the spraying program.”223 In other words, homeowners appreciated the fact
that DDT killed other insects as well. The author of the study further opined
that “we should expect an eventual extension of this activity to provide control
of all insects having public health significance.”224 Ongoing consideration of
the idea (which was eventually adopted), the author noted, would require more
extensive interior spraying of DDT than currently practiced.225
Margaret Humphreys, among others, has noted that indigenous cases of
malaria in the United States had declined dramatically before the establishment
of the MCWA. In a 1996 article, Humphreys posed the following provocative
questions:
Why did the federal and state public health establishment choose this
declining disease for a major eradication campaign, when diseases
such as tuberculosis, syphilis, and polio had a much larger impact on
morbidity and mortality? And why did they do so in the early 1940s,
226
just when evidence of its imminent demise was coming to light?

The questions are particularly important because of the MCWA’s role in the
use of DDT. The introduction of DDT by the MCWA on such a large scale
seems to have attacked only a small problem.
As one answer to these questions, Humphreys noted that malaria data in the
United States was woefully inaccurate until the late 1940s, and most scientists
believed malaria epidemics were cyclical, with a dramatic upsurge having
occurred as recently as 1935–36.227 But a framework answer to these
questions undoubtedly must center on the militarization of the South during
World War II. Malaria was known to exist in the region; soldiers from every
part of the United States would be trained there; important war industries
operated there; and the federal government doubted the ability of state and
local governments to protect these war assets.

223
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Figure 5:
Theodore Geisel, better known as Dr. Seuss, illustrated this 1943 pamphlet
used to educate the public and members of the armed forces about the causes
of malaria. Geisel served as a captain in the U.S. Army during World War II.

From 1942 to 1945, the MCWA had its headquarters in Atlanta. At the end
of the war, the Office took on the mission to eradicate malaria (not just control
it) everywhere in the United States. The primary rationale for continuing the
effort now shifted to preventing the reintroduction of malaria from returning
military personnel who had served overseas. These veterans would return to
homes and workplaces throughout the United States. As one advocate for
expansion of the MCWA mission warned in 1945, “Millions of American
soldiers and sailors are operating, or will operate, in Central Africa and in the
South West Pacific which include the most fever-ridden areas on the surface of
the globe. We already have warning signals of the results which we may
expect.”228 Those “warning signals” included recent malaria epidemics in New
Jersey, Ohio, and Michigan.229
At the close of World War II, then, the MCWA shifted its emphasis to
preventing importation of malaria and other insect-borne diseases via returning
228
229
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U.S. troops, thus retaining its funding, extending its jurisdiction nationwide,
and justifying the establishment of a permanent agency. MCWA officials in
1945 stressed “the need that will develop in the future for protecting the
general population from the servicemen who will return to their home
communities as carriers of even more virulent strains of plasmodia than those
with which we have been familiar in the United States.”230
Although the MCWA was officially terminated at the conclusion of the
war, various successor organizations followed. But the original core of the
MCWA remained in Atlanta, renamed first the Communicable Disease
Center,231 and later the Center for Disease Control and Prevention.232 In its
early years, the CDC remained primarily concerned with malaria, and to
accomplish its eradication goal, agency employees continued to train state and
local health agencies in malaria-control techniques and strategies, as well as to
supply larvicides and financial support. But CDC employees no longer
engaged directly in spraying and other eradication efforts. The war’s
conclusion brought with it the discontinuation of the MCWA’s malaria control
program, shifting employee efforts to less direct interventions.
Moreover, while the new Communicable Disease Center continued “certain
training and investigation functions” of the MCWA, its expertise expanded to
other insect-borne and contagious diseases.233 “[T]ropical and related
infections,” which the renamed MCWA would take on, had “certain
extraterritorial and interstate aspects which make them matters of Federal
concern as well.”234 While this addition to the extended malaria control
230
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program could be “considered heterogeneous from clinical and nosologic
points of view,” it was nonetheless “eminently sound, sensible, and workable
from the standpoints of laboratory diagnosis, epidemiologic investigation, and
control operations,” according to a 1946 article in Public Health Reports.235
The Communicable Disease Center, still located in Atlanta but awaiting
construction of a large facility on property donated by Emory University,236
was charged to “continue certain training and investigation functions of the
Office of Malaria Control in War Areas,”237 although it did not continue to
perform spraying and drainage through its employees, as it had during the war.
Its operational services included field-testing, evaluation of vector control,
equipment design and testing, insecticide research, and training of state health
workers.238 These activities, the CDC’s early proponents noted, “exceed the
resources and facilities of individual States. They are concerned to a large
degree with interstate and extracontinental health hazards.”239 As a post-war
fledgling public health agency, it was hoped “earnestly that the peacetime
Communicable Disease Center will merit and receive the support and
cooperation of State health departments to the same or even greater extent than
did the war-related Office of Malaria Control in War Areas.”240
The CDC’s own history of the malaria-eradication campaign notes that the
TVA’s malaria assessment and control activities, along with the MCWA’s
work in the southeastern United States, “were so successful that at the end of
the war and the founding of CDC, one of the initial tasks was to oversee the
completion of the elimination of malaria as a major public health problem.”241
In 1949, the CDC reported that the country was “declared free of malaria as a
significant public health problem.”242
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To what extent did the MCWA’s activities contribute to this result? Dr.
Justin Andrews noted in 1948:
That malaria reduction occurred near many of these operation sites as
a result of breeding place destruction and antilarval measures is
indisputable, but that these areas were sufficiently numerous,
extensive, or malariogenically important to produce a coalescent
malaria depression throughout the South is hardly credible.
Furthermore, malaria has diminished to a greater or lesser degree in
areas beyond the influence of the TVA and untouched by WPA or
MCWA. Thus, it is evident that other factors in addition to
interference with anopheline production have been concerned in this
243
phenomenon.

One writer in 1945 posited that poverty in the South, especially among
tenant farmers, was the primary factor for the tenacity of malaria.244 Using the
price of cotton and income data from federal tax returns, the writer showed a
correlation between declining incomes and cyclical recurrences of malaria in
Mississippi. This data, he claimed, ran counter to the view that malaria rates
closely tracked the total amount of rainfall for a given year.245 While lauding
the “very beneficial” and “concrete results” from efforts to control malaria by
eliminating mosquito breeding grounds, he also noted that improvement in
socioeconomic conditions must occur to “eliminate the disease from this
country.”246 Poor people lived in substandard housing, were malnourished,
and had less access to health care and prophylactic malaria medicines. Malaria
itself exacerbated the cycle of poverty.247 The MCWA attacked the newly
federalized mosquito, but the general rise in prosperity following the Great
Depression greatly aided its effort.
Although scholars disagree about whether malaria was already on the wane
in the South in the 1940s, it is clear that the MCWA became at least
symbolically important as a model of public health intervention by the federal
government. In 1945, as World War II concluded, a senior sanitary engineer
243
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with the U.S. Public Health Service cited the MCWA as a prime example “that
a new era of federal-state coöperative effort is here.”248
CONCLUSION
In the early decades of the twentieth century, race, poverty, and the
monopoly of state and local health boards led to little regional progress against
malaria in the United States. The subsequent story is about federal efforts to
eradicate malaria, efforts that extended federal jurisdiction within states, and
ultimately, a declaration of success. But some scientists and historians
conclude that malaria eradication in the southern United States had as much to
do with changes in agricultural practices, economic improvement in the region,
and demographic shifts, as it did prophylactic mosquito-elimination measures
taken by state and federal agencies.249
Could the South have eliminated malaria without federal dollars? Some
scholars suggest this could be the case. Local and state health organizations
contributed to the eradication of malaria in the United States, as did private
enterprise and philanthropy. Even if malaria might have been eliminated in
this way, the eradication of malaria in the region would certainly have been
delayed. For the purpose of this Article, that debate is significantly beside the
point. From a federalization perspective, the critical point is that the federal
government initiated a malaria-eradication effort with broad jurisdiction that
helped reshape public perception of the federal government’s responsibilities.
It did so under a “national security” mandate that blurred the distinction
between domestic and international security, with an effect on the federal
government’s regulatory power. But the federal government then withdrew
from this wartime assertion of jurisdiction, leaving public health federalism
largely unchanged.
The first regionally coordinated efforts at malaria control in the South
occurred in the 1940s as a national security mandate connected with America’s
entry into World War II. This national security mandate was part of a larger
story of increasing federal powers in public health efforts, touted as both a
matter of domestic policy and essential to the war effort. The federal CDC,
and its location in Atlanta, was a direct result of this wartime mandate. World
War II sealed the New Deal transformation for this public health issue,
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overcoming some of the hurdles of federalism and regional suspicion of the
federal government.
The legacy of a centralized, broadly charged agency like the CDC was thus
not a direct result of New Deal efforts but of war exigency. Before World War
II, federal efforts to combat malaria in the South were content with a
patchwork approach, which was all that was politically feasible. Multistate
coordination was a direct result of the invocation of war necessity. The Office
of Malaria Control in War Areas provided a significant federalism precedent in
the area of public health.
The establishment of the Federal Security Agency, and later the MCWA,
followed the failure of Roosevelt’s national health insurance scheme. The
FSA established an early tradition of federal institutions combating discrete
health problems. Nonetheless, federalization of the mosquito to combat
malaria in the South would not federalize public health in the United States to
any great extent. Public health law remains decentralized and primarily a state
obligation.
Malaria-eradication efforts in the South paralleled an increased reliance on
agency implementation, a story familiar in industry and monetary regulation
during the New Deal era. But the eventual emergence of a more unified
federal approach to this public health issue is anything but a straightforward
story of a turn to agency expertise to solve a public problem. The early New
Deal programs were uncoordinated and haphazard. But for the needs of the
military during World War II, it is unlikely that a unified federal approach, let
alone an agency specifically charged to combat malaria, would have emerged.
Furthermore, “federalization” was complicated by views of state rights and
local authority. The MCWA answered to the newly created Division of States
Relations within the U.S. Public Health Service, with district offices accepting
responsibility for federal-state relations. The MCWA worked primarily
through state and local boards of health, but due to wartime powers allocated
to the agency, malaria-eradication efforts came to be viewed as a distinct
obligation of the federal government. Some elements of southern society
needed little convincing that malaria was a drag on the southern economy, but
the South continued to be suspicious of government generally, and the federal
government specifically. Ironically, a limited-purpose federal agency became
the prime mover toward an organization with more permanent possibilities, as
we see today with the federal Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
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The “new federalism” of the United States Supreme Court has been
described in the public health arena to “rel[y] heavily on a rigid and categorical
view of the boundaries between federal and state power.”250 Although this
Article does not specifically engage recent scholarship in “new federalism”
public health in the United States, it is interesting to observe that the
contemporary popular expectation is that the federal government steps in to
control health epidemics, natural disasters, and so forth. The mindset in the
1930s and 1940s was different in many regions of the United States. This
mindset was particularly entrenched in the South, where federalism issues
presented the specter of national interference with southern racial issues.
Yet the experience of the MCWA and subsequent efforts to eradicate
malaria gained widespread acceptance, due perhaps in no small part to respect
for the military and recognition of the need to protect it along with the larger
war effort. The military voice carried great weight in Washington under the
Roosevelt Administration, and it was ultimately this emphasis on malaria
control as a national security priority that won out, however temporarily, over
disputes about domestic allocation of power. The subsequent federal
withdrawal after the war from assertions of direct jurisdictional authority over
health matters within states left no permanent alteration in public health
federalism, even if the war provided the impetus for establishment of the
federal Centers for Disease Control. Today, the CDC still works under the
federalism paradigm in place throughout the twentieth century, as a “federal
service organization to provide specialized assistance to the states, which have
legislative responsibility for disease control.”251 The MCWA’s malariaeradication effort served as a model for the CDC’s role in the global
eradication of smallpox by 1980.252
Moreover, efforts at malaria control in the 1930s and 1940s display a
remarkable flexibility of administrative approach by federal executive
agencies. This approach, experimentation with adjustments as needed, echoed
on a smaller scale other endeavors by Franklin Roosevelt during the New Deal.
In the end, the mosquito became a subject of federal jurisdiction without an
explicit declaration of federal authority. This federal intervention to eradicate
malaria was an aberration—although a small one—in the customary division
250
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of authority between the states and the federal government in matters of public
health.

